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Resumen 
Un escenario común en el comercio internacional es la existencia de restricciones al libre 
comercio, aún cuando la mayoría de los economistas están de acuerdo con sus beneficios, para 
países de distinto tamaño y nivel de desarrollo económico. En contextos dónde los políticos 
ofrecen diferentes opciones de políticas y los votantes las demandan en base a sus preferencias 
individuales, se podría preguntar qué determina las preferencias individuales sobre las políticas 
de comercio y cuáles aspectos económicos, culturales y sociales les dan forma.  
 
El objetivo de este trabajo es enfrentar este problema con una muestra heterogénea de treinta y 
cuatro países los cuales incluyen países desarrollados y en desarrollo, grandes y pequeños. Con 
tal objetivo se usa la base de datos del ISSP (International Social Survey Program) del año 
2003. Utilizando modelos probit ordenados, se concluye que los elementos tales como religión, 
preferencias políticas y nacionalismo, tanto como características sociodemográficas y 
funcionamiento del país, tienen un impacto significativo sobre las preferencias  
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INTRODUCTION 
Even when the majority of economists agree on the benefits of free trade, everywhere we turn 
to, trade is restricted. Endogenous trade policy models describe political contexts where 
politicians offer different policy options and voters demand them based on their individual 
preferences. It is the institutional background the key element that determines how this supply 
and demand interact and translate into actual trade policies. Thus, one may ask, what 
determines personal preferences on trade policy; which economic, cultural and social elements 
shape them. The aim of this paper is to answer these questions in the case of a great variety of 
countries included in the sample.  
In this paper we use data from the module on National Identity of the 2003 International Social 
Survey Program (ISSP). The ISSP is an ongoing effort devoted to cross-national research on 
social attitudes. In addition to asking general questions about attitudes towards social issues, 
the ISSP series also includes special topic modules focusing on matters such as national identity 
and the role of government. The individuals were sampled across all five continents and the 
survey asks respondents their opinions on various issues, including trade preferences, patriotism 
and politics. In addition, it includes demographic and socio-economic data. 
We estimate ordered probit models in order to study the impact of each of these variables on 
individual preferences on trade policy. We conclude that elements such as religion, political 
preferences, and nationalism, as well as demographic characteristics and country performance, 
have a significant impact on trade policy preferences. 
In the first section of this paper we introduce briefly the theory on the subject. In section two we 
describe the data used in this paper. In section three we show the estimated model and in 
section four we present our findings. Finally in section five we conclude. 
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1. DETERMINANTS OF INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES FOR 
PROTECTIONISM: PREDICTIONS FROM THEORETICAL MODELS 
 
  1.1 Political economy of trade policies 
A common scenario for international commerce is the existence of restrictions on free trade, 
even when the majority of economists agree on the benefits of it. More particularly, small 
economies usually benefit more from openness given the relative smaller size of their domestic 
markets. Even more, there is a consensus among economists that this type of economies cannot 
grow steadily if it is not through opening its borders to the world
1.  
The question that inevitably arises is: why do governments choose trade policies that are 
apparently sub-optimal? The literature on this subject has tried to explain this phenomenon 
based on the idea that policy makers have objectives that differ from economic maximization. 
There are basically two trends in “endogenous” trade policy determination theory: the median-
voter model and the interest group model. 
The median-voter model supposes a uni-dimensional policy choice (for example, an import tariff 
to a particular good), the policy preferences are single-peaked and a given policy is voted 
directly or the government chooses the policy that better reflects the majority’s opinion on that 
subject. In this context, the policy preference chosen by the median voter cannot be dominated 
by any other alternative in a majority voting (Black, 1958). On the other hand, in the interest 
groups model, the economic interests are represented by organized lobby groups, and it is 
through their interaction with the government that trade policy is designed (Gawande and 
Krishna, 2003). Additionally, Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) showed that the followed 
patterns of protectionism by United States are influenced by the “contributions” made by lobby 
groups and their competition given that the level of protection is “sold” to lobby groups. 
Both models describe a political context where politicians offer different policy options and voters 
demand policies based on their individual preferences, and the institutional background 
determines how this supply and demand interact and translate into actual trade policies 
(O’Rourke and Sinnot, 2006). Thus, one may ask, what are the determinants of personal 
preferences on trade policy? Which economic, cultural, social elements affect them? The aim of 
this paper is to answer these questions. 
                                                 
1 As early as Adam Smith expressed in the “Wealth of Nations”:  “In countries, besides, less extensive … they 
generally require the support of foreign trade. Without an extensive foreign market they could not well 
flourish… in countries so moderately extensive as to afford but a narrow home market …” (Book IV Chapter 
IX).   5
  1.2 International trade models 
International trade models provide a first approach to this issue. The two basic models are the 
Hecksher-Ohlin model (H-O) that supposes complete factor mobility and the Ricardo-Viner model 
(R-V) that includes specific factors. Although they provide opposing predictions on trade policy 
preferences based on the differing consequences of free trade in each country given by their 
different specialization patterns; there is no contradiction between those models given the 
assumption about factor’s mobility. There is an academic consensus on considering the H-O 
model as a long-run model and the R-V model as a short-run model.  
The H-O model supposes complete costless factor mobility across sectors and predicts that trade 
liberalization will benefit those who hold the relatively abundant factor and be detrimental to 
those who own the relatively scarce one. This implies that trade policy preference will differ 
among individuals depending on their relative factor endowment. On the other hand, the R-V 
model assumes the existence of sector-specific factors, and therefore predicts that individual 
trade policy preferences will depend on whether they are employed in an import-substituting or 
export industry (Gawande et al., 2003). 
As it was mentioned, in the specific case of labor, these models should not be considered 
necessarily as opposites, since one or the other could be applicable depending on the individual 
time horizon. People with a relatively short time horizon will see themselves as immobile and 
therefore, their preferences will be those predicted by the R-V model, however, people with a 
long time horizon will take into account the possibility of inter-sector mobility and their 
preferences will be determined as described in the H-O model (Scheve and Slaugther, 2001). 
In the H-O model with two goods, two production factors (skilled and unskilled labor) and two 
countries (S abundant in unskilled labor and N abundant in skilled labor), a reduction in trade 
barriers causes each country to specializes in the production of the good intensive in their 
relatively abundant factor, increasing the demand for this factor in its country and therefore its 
return. Consequently, wage inequality will decrease in country S and increase in country N. For 
this reason, unskilled workers in country S will support free trade while skilled workers will 
oppose it, however in country N skilled workers will support free trade and unskilled workers will 
oppose it. In reference to trade policy preferences, based on this model one would expect that 
unskilled workers in developing countries (where unskilled labor is abundant) would prefer free 
trade while skilled workers would oppose it, and that the opposite would be true for developed 
countries, where skilled labor is abundant. 
O’Rourke et al. (2006), Beaulieu, Dehejia and Zakhilwal (2004), Baker (2005) and Mayda et al. 
(2005) found that skilled workers are more prone to accept free trade. Furthermore, those 
studies showed that the differential support to free trade between skilled and unskilled workers 
is higher in countries relatively abundant in skill labour.    6
Mayda et al. (2005) made a comparative analysis of twenty three countries and conclude that 
the evidence supports the H-O model. They find that people with higher endowments of human 
capital oppose trade restrictions only in countries that are abundant in human capital, like 
Germany and USA, while in Philippines (the poorest country in their sample), the opposite 
happens. The remaining countries in the sample are half way between those two extremes. 
Consequently, trade policy preferences not only depend on each person’s individual 
characteristics (years of schooling) but also to their country’s (education level in the country). 
However, in general the empirical evidence shows that both in developed and developing 
countries the more qualified is a person the less likely he or she is to oppose free trade. 
Moreover, trade liberalization in a developing country does not necessarily cause a reduction in 
wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor but quite the opposite. For example, in the 
case of Uruguay, Arim and Zoppolo (2000) showed that the wage differences associated to 
formal education increased during the nineties, when the country was going through a process of 
increasing trade liberalization and regional integration. Moreover, they show that the demand for 
skilled labor increased both relatively to the demand for unskilled labor and in absolute terms. 
How can this fact be explained? One possible explanation of this phenomenon is that trade 
liberalization could increase direct foreign investment in the developing country, which could 
bring about the development of new activities that are intensive in skilled labor (Feenstra and 
Hanson, 1997). In the case of Uruguay, Arim et al. (2001) argued that trade liberalization and 
regional integration caused significant changes in the country’s productive structure and 
employment in each sector, decreasing the relevance of manufacture (both in GDP and 
employment) and increasing the importance of sector such as construction, financial services 
and other services for enterprises. 
On the other hand, if skilled labor and capital are complementary in the exploitation of a specific 
natural resource, wage inequality in a developing country could increase with trade liberalization, 
which would explain why skilled workers in developing countries may prefer free trade. 
Additionally, people with higher education anywhere in the world may be more flexible and more 
a b l e  t o  d e a l  w i t h  t h e  r i g o r s  o f  t h e  m a r k e t , and therefore more likely to support trade 
liberalization (O’Rourke et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, even in a model of two factors, developing countries are not homogeneous in 
terms of their factor endowments. In some of them a certain factor may be scarce relative to 
developed countries but abundant relative to other developing countries (O’Rourke et al., 2006), 
if trade liberalization intensifies trade with other developing countries with lower human capital 
endowment, wage inequality could increase as it would in a developed country. 
Finally, another element to be considered is mobility both national and international. In respect 
to national mobility, the idea is that those willing or more able to reallocate within the country   7
would be more optimistic regarding the dislocation implicit in trade liberalization than those who 
are immobile. In the case of international mobility, following Rodrik (1997), the argument is that 
globalization tends to favor production factors that are internationally mobile than those that are 
immobile, if unskilled labor is less mobile than skilled labor, unskilled workers everywhere will 
oppose free trade (O’Rourke et al., 2006). 
Summing up, if some of the model’s assumptions are lifted (more than two factors, international 
flows of production factors, links between trade and technology transfers, etc.) the theoretical 
result regarding trade liberalization and wages becomes ambiguous (O’Rourke et al., 2006) and 
therefore, so do its conclusions regarding trade policy preferences. 
In addition to that, a great part of world trade and more than the half of the total volume of 
trade of high-income country can be considered as Intra-industry trade. Trade of similar 
products cannot so straightforward been explained in the framework of the H-O model since 
trade of similar goods incorporates the same proportion of factor endowment and as a 
consequence will not have the same redistribution impact. 
As explained by the new theories of international trade of the Eighties, trade of similar products 
are justified by the similarity of tastes and production structures, reason why two-way trade 
usually takes place between countries with similar levels of development and next factor 
endowments. Inter-industry trade was supposed to generate important reallocation of resources 
among industries and important adjustment costs in the short term (Krugman, 1980). Thus, 
integration between countries, which trade was mostly IIT was seen as less traumatic since it 
implies a reallocation of resources among firms, but within a same industry. This argument, 
sometimes called "smooth adjustment hypothesis" was highlighted in the Eighties by Helpman 
and Krugman, 1985. 
The question of the welfare effects of trade integration according to the nature of trade was 
examined again in the Nineties at the light of new empirical evidence. Trade of similar or 
differentiated products could be of different type since the products can be differentiated 
horizontally or vertically. In the first case, products differ in their design, color or another 
attribute but not intrinsically. In the second case, products are differentiated by their quality and 
supposed to be the fruit of different technologies or to incorporate different proportion of 
production factors
2. Then, specialization in a high or low quality segment could entail adjustment 
similar to those of inter-industry trade. So a great proportion of intra-industry trade with vertical 
differentiation does not foretell similarities between the countries or regions and does not 
                                                 
2
 The production of quality goods requires capital (Falvey, 1981 and Falvey and Kierzkowski, 1987), a more 
qualified manual labor (Gabszewicz, 1997). It can be explained by rent and technology differences (Flam and 
Helpman, 1987) or to be fruit of important expenses in R&D (Gabszewicz and to. 1981). The works of Blanes 
and Martín (2000), Durkin and Krygier (2000), Fontagné (1998), Greenaway (1995) and Martín and Orts (2001) 
contribute empirical verifications of some of these relations.   8
necessarily mean that adjustment could me less traumatic. Besides, this type of two-way trade 
is not supposed to take place only between similar countries but could develop among very 
different partners as far as development level is concerned.  
Finally, Denslow, and Fullerton (1996), emphasize the importance of the phase of the economic 
cycle in which the country is. Risk aversion influences on people attitudes towards uncertainty 
generated by the elimination of barriers to trade and the phase of the economic cycle could 
amplify or reduced this effect. 
  1.3 Other important factor: proximity 
Another key factor for explaining trade is proximity. Gravitational law has been proposed by 
e c o n o m i s t s  t o  e x p l a i n  b i l a t e r a l  t r a d e .  F i r s t l y ,  t h e  n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t  o f  p h y s i c a l  d i s t a n c e  w a s  
evidenced and justified as a proxy for transport costs. It has been demonstrated than neighbors 
countries trade more between themselves than explained by economic factors as size of their 
production and demand and endowments. As reviewed by Disdier and Mayer (2007), the impact 
of proximity on trade can be divided in two components. The reduction of transportation costs 
(freight, communication, information costs) and affinity between countries the two countries for 
cultural, historical or political reasons that do influence preferences of consumers. Survey from 
Rauch (2001) offers large evidence on a positive link between bilateral migration and trade as a 
proof of the importance of cultural links. Common language and colonial links have a large and 
positive impact on bilateral trade flows. Disdier et al. (2007) studies the relationship between 
opinions in favor of the Eastern enlargement of the EU expressed by citizens of the EU and trade 
flows. They conclude that bilateral affinity has a large impact on trade even when proximity is 
controlled for. They also find that trade and other countries specific factors affect significant 
bilateral opinion about enlargement. However they find more evidence supporting the first 
relation.  
 
2. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
  2.1 The data 
The data source for individual characteristics is the module on National Identity of the 2003 
ISSP’s survey. In Uruguay the survey was carried out by the Department of Economics (dECON) 
of the School of Social Sciences (UDELAR) in cooperation with the Institute of Statistics of the 
School of Economics of UDELAR, in the context of the ISSP program. The fieldwork was carried   9
out by the team of conduct and opinion studies of dECON in August of 2004 and the University 
of Pennsylvania financed it
3. 
The survey asks respondents their opinions on a great variety of issues, including trade 
preferences, immigration, patriotism, and politics, as well as demographic and socio-economic 
information, such as age, gender, education, religiosity, political party, and others. 
The question used in the survey to identify the respondent’s trade preferences is: 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 
“Respondent’s country” should limit the import of foreign products 
in order to protect its national economy? 
It could be argued that the last part of the question ("in order to protect its national economy”) 
causes a bias in favor of protectionism, given that it implies that limiting imports is a way of 
protecting the economy and therefore, something positive. However, there are two arguments 
that partially cancel out this critic. Firstly, this is the usual speech used to defend protectionist 
policies and therefore they are the usual terms used to discuss the matter, and thus the 
question would not induce necessarily the person to answer in a particular way. And secondly, 
the goal in this paper is to analyze the relationship between this variable and others and not 
estimate the absolute level of support for protectionism, and thus it is less vulnerable to this 
type of bias (O'Rourke et al., 2006). 
INSERT TABLE 1: ANSWERS BY COUNTRY 
On average, about 1000 persons have answered the survey in each country with a total of 
42,154 observations. Table 1 shows the number of persons who agrees, doesn’t know or 
disagrees with the statement and the number of person for each considered country. The share 
ranges from 28.9% (in Sweden) to 81.9% (from Arabs from Israel). The share of people who 
definitively disagrees or strongly disagrees with protectionism measures rarely overpasses 30% 
except for Switzerland (43%), Sweden (35%), Norway (36%) and Denmark (48%). It is striking 
that this three last countries are neighbors and have close politics system with strong 
intervention of State.  
Since our purpose is to find some evidence about country and individual characteristics that 
explain opinions about protectionism we have gathered some data on country characteristics. 
Economic factors like GNI per capita, average growth, production structure, imports penetration 
rate were calculated using the World Development Database. Trade policy indicators were 
                                                 
3 The dECON team thanks Professor Frank Furstenberg and the University of Pennsylvania whose financial 
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obtained from the World Bank web page. We also take into account some geographic, cultural 
and historical characteristics of the countries using variables from the CEPII database. 
For the purpose of the model, national characteristics and individuals answers have been 
transformed in dummies variables. 
  2.2 The models 
As mentioned above, this paper aims at contributing to the literature in two manners. First, we 
generalized Mayda et al. (2005) results with a larger sample. Second, to seek if country-specific 
variables (economic, cultural, historical or politics) contribute to a better understanding of 
opinion toward trade policies. 
A first choice for modelling is how to code answers. Mayda et al. (2005) chosen to transform the 
answer in a dummy variable (Against-Trade dummy =1 if people agree or agree strongly and 0 
in other cases). We opted for another possibility since we think that people who neither agrees 
nor disagrees should be considered as more supportive for protectionism than people who 
disagrees.  
The model aims at determining how different individual characteristics and country 
characteristics affect the formation of favorable opinions towards protectionism. 
In this respect, our dependent variable can then take more than two values and the increase in 
the value does matter. So, we estimate an ordered probit model
4. Independents variables whose 
present a positive and significant sign should be interpreted as enhancing protectionism. But 
coefficient can not be interpreted as elasticity whether they represent the marginal effect of 
increase of the probability of being indifferent to protectionism or to support it strongly. 
The dependent variable seeks to grasp citizenship’s opinions on protectionism and it is defined 
as follow: Protect = “respondent’s country” should limit the import of foreign products in order 
to protect its national economy: 3 being agree or agree strongly, 2 being neither agree nor 
disagree and 1 being disagree or disagree strongly.  
The phenomenon we are trying to model is discrete, the unobserved or latent variable is the 
variable protect (degree of support to protectionism from foreign products) which is related to a 
set of independent variables observed either at the individual level (xp) or at the level of the 
country i of residence of the person p (Xi). 
 
                                                 
4 For this estimation we use the oprobit command in Stata version 8.   11
In an alternative model individual characteristics (xp) are interacted with some country 
characteristics (Xi).  
The description of all variables used is displayed in table 2. 
INSERT TABLE 2: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
1.  Variable that reflects human capital.  
This is the crucial parameter here since most authors consider it at reflecting people are 
supposed to be differently affected by trade liberalization depending on their skill. Regarding H-O 
model. Mayda et al. (2005) considers the years of education. By integrating a continuous 
variable, the interpretation of the results could differ.  
2.  Variables related to ideology and religion.  
Regarding individual's ideology, we consider the person's political affiliation. One would expect 
that those who define themselves as belonging to the left would be more likely to support 
protectionist policies than those who identify with the right (Daniels and Ruhr, 2005). 
A second element to consider is the person's religious denomination. Guiso, Sapienza and 
Zingales (2003) argued that religious beliefs not necessarily affect their followers' attitudes 
towards the economic system “through literal messages found in sacred texts or in statements 
by religious leaders”, but rather that they affect attitudes as a “low-frequency variable” based on 
teachings and conditioned by the cultural background. Moreover, they argue that attitudes 
towards trade with "others" and accepting "others" differ between religious denominations. In 
their study for the United States, they find that Catholics, Baptists and Methodists are more 
likely to support trade restrictions, than those with no religious affiliation. 
3.  Variable reflecting income or social status.  
4.  Variables related to patriotism, nationalism and chauvinism.  
5.  Variables that reflect national pride for particular characteristics of the country. How 
proud are you of “respondent's country” in…? (art and literature achievements, the way 
democracy works, economic achievements, scientific and technological achievements or 
achievements in sports). 
Additionally, O'Rourke et al. (2006) state that values, attachments, and national identity play an 
important role in trade-policy preferences, due to the fact that such elements could translate 
into feelings of national superiority and antagonistic attitudes towards foreign products. 
In this respect, there are different degrees of attachments to one's country, which defines the 
differences between patriotism, nationalism and chauvinism. Patriotism is the genuine feeling of   12
attachment to one's country, while nationalism implies a greater devotion for one's country 
placing it above others: chauvinism is an extreme form of nationalism characterized by a feeling 
of superiority in regard to other nations (Mayda et al., 2005). 
Even when these three concepts are linked to national pride, they are clearly different. National 
pride and patriotism coexist, while nationalism goes far beyond national pride. Indeed, the latter 
is a prerequisite to the former. Thus, there is no contradiction between feelings such as national 
pride and cosmopolitanism, while nationalism and cosmopolitanism are in essence contradictory 
(Smith et al., 1999). In consequence, patriotism is not contradictory to supporting free trade, 
while in the case of nationalism the relationship is ambiguous. It will depend on the person’s 
intake on the consequences of free trade. If the person sees free trade as a positive-sum game, 
and therefore accepts that trade implies benefits for the country as a whole, one would expect 
"patriots” (those who cares for the country as a whole and not consider distributive effects) to 
favor free trade; however, if the person perceives trade as a zero-sum game in which some 
nations win and others lose or if they consider that the social consequences could be adverse, 
they would be likely to support trade restrictions. Finally, those who consider their country better 
than others are more likely to prefer their country’s isolation and therefore, would support 
import-restrictive policies (Mayda et al., 2005). 
6.  Variables reflecting employment status. 
7.  Variables related to the sector of employment. 
Taking into account the specific sector of employment, we constructed three variables: 
agriculture industry and services. This effect is potentially relevant given the fact that it is 
expected that international trade policies affect sector performance and therefore, people 
opinions. 
8.  Other socio-demographic variables considered. 
Finally, there are many demographic variables that are relevant to explain trade policy 
preferences. For example, in regard to age and gender, previous empirical studies show the 
elderly are more likely to support import-restrictive policies than younger people. The same can 
be said for women in comparison to men. Additionally, some empirical studies find that married 
people are also more likely to support trade restrictions. 
  2.3 Country specific variables  
Variables reflecting the size of the country: RGDP is either supposed to be a good proxy for the 
size of supply or the demand while population is supposed to be a good proxy of the demand. 
Each variable is supposed to have a positive impact on protectionism since big countries are 
more self sufficient and can also benefit from power market to increase their term of trade.    13
Variables reflecting the endowment: GNI per capita is used as a proxy for capital intensity. This 
is a crucial variable to check the Samuelson theorem hypothesis. A GNI per capita superior to 
the world average will be considered as reflecting a capital abundant country so trade 
liberalization should be more beneficial for high skill workers and capital investors. Countries 
that shares higher GNI per capita also have similar tastes and production structure and are 
supposed to have a more important share of intra-industry trade. According to the “smooth 
adjustment” hypothesis, this type of specialization (at least as far as horizontal differentiation is 
concerned and to a lesser extent the vertical one) should suppose lower adjustment costs. 
Variables reflecting macroeconomic environment like the past average growth or the rate of 
inflation. The first one is expected to influence negatively protectionism opinion while the second 
generates more uncertainty and should cause protectionist pressures. 
Variables reflecting the importance of trade for the country: share of imports and exports in 
GDP. The relation is not straightforward since these variables are clearly influenced by trade 
policies which in turn must be influenced by national opinion towards protectionism. Namely, a 
low penetration rate can reflect a very high protectionist policy and should be associated with 
supporting protectionism from who benefits from protectionist measures but could alternatively 
be viewed as an impediment for the others. A high penetration rate could reflect an important 
dependency towards foreign products and should be associated with a strong support for trade 
or either could be as a possible source of disequilibrium for the economy and associates with a 
strong support for protectionist measures. So the expected sign for this variable is largely 
undetermined. The way exports affect protectionist policies is more unambiguous. We expect 
that countries that do not benefit from a dynamic exporting sector are more willing to protect 
their national industries from foreign competition. A higher proportion of export should also be 
associated with a better market access to foreign markets. If this one is due to preferential 
treatment people should be aware of this might be reciprocal. If this is due an extremely 
competitive sector, the conclusion may be more ambiguous.  
Trade policies indicator: there are of two types. We consider indicator of protection of the 
market and indicator of market access. The World Bank built these indicators considering 
different type of instruments: tariffs only, tariffs and NTB and different sectors: Agriculture and 
manufacturing. Generally speaking a more restrictive policy should be explained by stronger 
support for protectionism but the opposite is not so evident. The manner in which restrictive 
trade policies influence opinion of people depends on the way they consider they affect them and 
the degree of awareness they have of these policies. In this way, it is interesting to consider 
different sector (and we would like to interact it with the sector in which the people work). The 
instruments employed are neither neutral since tariffs are more transparent instruments than 
quantitative restrictions so people are more aware of their inconvenient while the anti-
competitive effect of quantitative restriction is not well-known. Turning to market access, a   14
better market access should favor positive opinion towards trade in general while a poor market 
access should favor protectionist opinions.  
Regarding variables reflecting other transactional costs in trade; as mentioned earlier, new trade 
theory of trade and new empirical evidence in the line of the gravity models and works about 
trade costs tend to show that proximity in a large sense is a significant determinant of bilateral 
trade. We do not have bilateral opinions on trade here but we can check some of the 
explanations like cultural, historical or geographical facilities since consumers are unequally 
distributed around the world and in majority concentrated in the USA, European and Asian area. 
So speaking the language of one of these areas be located near them or have been in a 
colonizing relation with one of these countries should make easier trade in a general manner. 
The argument is information costs, transport costs should be reduced. Additionally, it is well 
known that former colonized countries are generally imposed lower duties for their products. 
Variables reflecting the structure of production: we consider the share of value added of three 
sectors: agriculture, manufacturing, ands services. Since Services are less tradable in nature a 
greater share of these products should associated with bigger support for protectionism. 
Agriculture and Manufacturing both produce tradable goods but the first ones depend on 
disposability of cropland areas. Trade barriers in this sector are normally higher and intensive 
primary goods like agriculture goods are less differentiates in nature. So a higher share of these 
goods should be associated with a support for protectionist pressure while an important share of 
manufacturing sector should be associated with a pro trade attitude. We alternatively consider 
the size of these sectors rather than the share. The expected effects could be different and 




In graphs displayed below offers a descriptive picture of which characteristics of countries 
increase the amount of people supporting protectionist policies. Relations between GNI per 
capita is clear although USA has a stronger support fro protectionism than its GNI per capita 
indicates while the opposite occurs for Sweden. Relation between trade policies instruments and 
protectionism support is not clear although all the countries that apply higher barriers to trade 
also have a strong support for protectionism. Differences in support fro protectionism among EU 
members is a good demonstration that the relation between trade policies and their support is 
heavily complex. Among the countries with lower barriers, the heterogeneity is also stricken. The 
relation between import of goods and services and the share of protectionist individuals is not as 
visual as for the GNI per capita with a big heterogeneity of positions among countries for which 
the penetration rate is an intermediate one (about 40%).   15
INSERT FIGURE 1: Share of people supporting protectionism and  
GNI per capita, trade policy and import penetration 
In analyzing the determinants of trade preferences formation, there are a number of non-
economic elements that need to be taken into account, including ideology, cultural and social 
background as well as demographic characteristics. Previous works of Mayda et al. (2005) 
highlight most of these effects for 23 countries and with the same survey. Our aim here is to 
confirm their results in the case of a bigger sample. The conclusion is not so straightforward 
since Beaulieu, Ravindra and Wang (2005) using opinion surveys on trade for 17 countries of 
Latin America do not confirm Mayda’s et al. (2005) conclusions. Generally speaking, most 
differences between these studies can be found in the samples since the majority of Latin 
American seems to support free trade while the opposite occurs in countries considered in the 
ISSP survey. 
INSERT TABLE 3: PROTECCIONISM OPINION – OPROBIT MODELS WITH FIX EFFECTS AND 
COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS 
LOOK TABLE 6 FOR MARGINAL EFFECTS 
Various probit models are exposed in table 3. The first model estimated takes into account the 
individual characteristics and fixed country effects. Models 2, 3, 4 and 5 consider alternative 
specification for proximity variables or macroeconomic environment. Models in table 4 consider 
different groups of countries (big, small, EU, non EU, high income or low income) to check the 
robustness of the results and the importance of economic variables. Last models presented in 
table 5 are an attempt to obtain more evidence about the importance of the specialization 
pattern and characteristics of trade policy on individual opinions.  
Since results for individual characteristics and the survey are little affected by the specification 
and the sample, we first present the results for these variables and then comment national 
variables. 
  3.1 Who supports protectionist measures? 
In general, our results are the expected according to the theoretical framework and previous 
empirical studies. Firstly, the degree of religiosity (measured by weekly attendance to religious 
services) has a significant and positive coefficient, which implies that people who attend to 
religious services are more likely to support import-restrictive policies than the rest. 
Additionally, political options are determinants of trade preferences. Those who identify 
themselves with the right are less likely to support protectionism. However, trade union 
membership does not seem to affect preferences while previous studies found that it influences 
protectionist attitude.    16
Regarding, socio-demographic variables the result shows that gender is significant in preference 
formation, indicating that women tend to be more protectionist than men. However, age is, in 
general, not significant.  
And finally, feelings related to patriotism and nationalism affect preferences as expected. 
Feelings of attachment to one’s country are not significant, which indicates that patriotism is not 
contradictory with non-protectionist preferences. On the other hand, strong feelings of national 
pride and national superiority are correlated with protectionist preferences. Additionally, while 
pride for the country’s democratic system does not have a significant impact.  
Turning to working activities, we found that being unemployed d o e s  n o t  h a v e  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  
impact. This is an unexpected result while people employed full time are more willing to be pro 
trade and people working part time are more supportive for protectionist measures. Working for 
government increases the probability to be protectionist while working for private firms or public 
ones is not significant.  
Relative economic status and skills also affects trade preferences significantly. They also have a 
striking importance since they offer a possibility to check the prevision of the H-O model. 
Individuals who place themselves higher in the income scale tend to be fewer protectionists, 
than those who place themselves lower in the scale. On the other hand, higher levels of 
education have a negative coefficient in the estimated model, which means that those with 
higher education are less likely to support protectionist policies.  
However, we find that the fact that people consider their income as high has a less significant 
impact in high income countries. In the same way, any qualification has a significant and 
negative impact when the whole sample is considered but for the second less skilled people this 
effect is only significant in high income countries.  
Our conclusions are similar to those of Mayda et al. (2005) who concluded that the variables that 
mostly influence preference formation are social status, relative income, values and 
attachments. In regard to attachments, our study also confirms that those who feel closer to 
their neighborhood, community, country or who define themselves as nationalists tend to be 
more protectionists. We confirm that the scale in which people place themselves have a 
significant effect: those who consider themselves as "richer" tend to favor trade more than those 
who see themselves as "poorer". We therefore add that this is less true in high income countries. 
We also agree that pro-trade preferences are positively and robustly correlated with an 
individual’s level of human capital but not as expected by the factor endowments model.    17
  3.2 Countries specificities 
Variables included in the model have generally significant impact on individual preferences but 
the way it influences personal attitude toward protectionism is in some cases, unexpected. 
Furthermore, impact differs depending on the type of countries: big or small, high or middle 
income. The explaining power of the model is in general larger for high income countries and 
small countries than for the others.  
INSERT TABLE 4: PROTECTIONISM OPINION - COUNTRIES CHARACTERISTICS  
LOOK TABLE 7 FOR MARGINAL EFFECTS 
INSERT TABLE 5: PROTECTIONISM OPINION - INDIVIDUAL STATUS AND COUNTRY 
ENDOWMENT 
LOOK TABLE 8 FOR MARGINAL EFFECTS 
People from the countries with larger stock of capital per worker (GNI per capita) are generally 
more in pro trade. This relation seems to be robust and independent of the countries sample 
except for small country. This should be interpreted as confirming the effect of IIT. In this case, 
the factor endowment is not a relevant topic.  
Concerning macroeconomic context, average growth actually influences negatively protectionism 
opinion while a higher rate of inflation shows an unexpected negative sign. This might be 
explained by the fact that countries with higher inflation of the sample view in trade a possibility 
to lower national prices. This result is apparently in opposition with the conclusion of the first 
model.  
People living in countries with higher import penetration rate are, generally speaking more likely 
to support protectionism. Actually, this is overall true for small countries and middle income 
countries while the opposite occurs in big countries (weight of USA).  
The way exports affect protectionist policies is more unambiguous. A higher proportion of export 
is associated with a non-protectionist attitude. However, this is less true in higher- income 
countries. We suggest that this difference believes in the fact that these countries export 
products with a lower price-elasticity of demand and are less sensitive to this argument.  
Turning to variables that reflect lower transaction costs for trading such as speaking English, we 
find that the result is the opposite we expected: English as an official language increases the 
probability to be protectionist while speaking Spanish decreases it. People living in countries 
closer from the USA or the EU are generally more protectionist than others. Living in countries 
that had colonial relationship has an ambiguous effect on the protectionist attitude.   18
Variables reflecting the structure of production: we consider the share of value added of three 
sectors: agriculture, manufacturing, ands services. Since Services are less tradable in nature a 
greater share of these products should associated with bigger support for protectionism. 
Agriculture and Manufacturing both produce tradable goods but the first ones depend on 
disposability of cropland areas. Trade barriers in this sector are normally higher and intensive 
primary goods like agriculture goods are less differentiates in nature. So a higher share of these 
goods should be associated with a support for protectionist pressure while an important share of 
manufacturing sector should be associated with a pro trade attitude. We alternatively consider 
the size of these sectors rather than the share. The expected effects could be different and 




The first model shows us that higher share of people supporting protectionism is associated with 
lower level of GDP per capita, high import penetration rates and lower export share. A worst 
market access influences positively the degree of protectionism while national trade policies 
don’t have a significant impact. While these economic determinants seem to be important at the 
national level, they are not always determinant at the individual level.  
Results of an ordered probit model highlights different aspects of the individual attitudes toward 
protectionism. Economic characteristics of the countries do affect individual attitude but some 
other politics, cultural characteristics not considered here may play an important role. People 
living in richer countries are more likely to disagree with protectionist measures. We interpreted 
it by the fact that their country must exchange on an intra-industry basis that supposes less 
adjustment costs. We also find that an important share of production in services (mostly non-
tradable goods) influences positively protectionist attitudes whatever the sample of country 
considered. A higher proportion of export is associated with a non-protectionist attitude while an 
important import penetration rate has an ambiguous effect. 
Individual characteristics explain more than half of the variance of the results among individuals. 
We find that non-economic characteristics such as national pride, chauvinism, religiosity, political 
affiliation, among others, have a great impact on trade policy preferences. Pro-trade preferences 
are positively and robustly correlated with an individual’s level of human capital or social status 
but not as expected by the factor endowment model since higher skills are negatively correlated 
with protectionist attitude independently of the endowment of the country they live in.  
However people who feels poor in rich countries have a more likely to be protectionist what 
supports the H-O hypothesis. For people with higher social status, they don’t seem to consider   19
their own status as relevant for this question. This result does not support the conclusions of the 
H-O model: it is consistent with this model in the case of developed countries but not for 
developing countries, given that according to this model skilled workers in developing countries 
should be more likely to support protectionism. In consequence, in the case of developing 
countries the rationality behind these preferences reflects a different perception of the impact of 
free trade than the one predicated by the H-O model.  
Consequently, this empirical fact is showing three possible open questions to further 
investigations: a) people take into account a short time horizon when forming these preferences 
or when evaluating this politics, b) the formation of this preferences could originated somewhere 
else than factor endowment or c) if a long-run perspective is accepted, it may reflect a different 
perception of the impact of free trade than the one predicated by the H-O model or the fact that 
more skilled persons do believe in that they can share the gains with unskilled people.   20
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ANNEX - TABLES 
TABLE 1: ANSWERS BY COUNTRY 
Country  noprotect protect  Not  know TOTAL  noprotect protect  Not  Know 
  n n n n %  %  % 
Australia  304 1387 407 2098 14,5 66,1 19,4 
Austria  224 561 169 954 23,5  58,8  17,7 
Bulgaria  109 722 114 945 11,5  76,4  12,1 
Canada  305 597 260  1162  26,2  51,4  22,4 
Chile  306 889 205  1400  21,9  63,5  14,6 
Czech-
Republic  321 599 263  1183  27,1  50,6  22,2 
Denmark  592 438 202  1232  48,1  35,6 16,4 
Finland  485 430 348  1263  38,4  34,0  27,6 
France  439 816 323  1578  27,8  51,7  20,5 
Germany-E  123  189 98 410  30,0  46,1  23,9 
Germany-W  275 345 175 795 34,6  43,4  22,0 
Great  Britain  136 498 204 838 16,2  59,4  24,3 
Hungary  129 633 208 970 13,3  65,3  21,4 
Ireland  288 601 153  1042  27,6  57,7  14,7 
Israel-ar  5  122 22 149 3,4  81,9 14,8 
Israel-je  261 622 154  1037  25,2  60,0  14,9 
Japan  291 418 315  1024  28,4  40,8  30,8 
Latvia  156 656 169 981 15,9  66,9  17,2 
New  Zealand  212 568 216 996 21,3  57,0  21,7 
Norway  503 486 394  1383  36,4  35,1  28,5 
Philippine 137 858 185  1180  11,6  72,7  15,7 
Poland  148 877 194  1219  12,1  71,9  15,9 
Portugal  301 890 203  1394  21,6  63,8  14,6 
Russia  447 1407 358 2212 20,2 63,6 16,2 
Slovak  110 758 284  1152 9,5 65,8  24,7 
Slovenia  299 559 198  1056  28,3  52,9  18,8 
South  Africa  386 1548 215 2149 18,0 72,0 10,0 
South  Korea  320 681 294  1295  24,7  52,6  22,7 
Spain  170 690 299  1159  14,7  59,5  25,8 
Sweden  389 319 394  1102  35,3  28,9  35,8 
Switzerland  443 375 203  1021  43,4  36,7  19,9 
United  States  203 724 253  1180  17,2  61,4  21,4 
Uruguay  136 767 146  1049  13,0  73,1  13,9 
Venezuela 373  764  7  1144 32,6 66,8  0,6 
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TABLE 2: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
variable name  variable label  Data source 
age_ Respondent’s  age  ISSP   
gender  1 if being a man and 2 if being a woman  ISSP 
attach  1 if feeling close or very close to country  ISSP  
pride  1 if feeling proud of his country  ISSP 
pride2  1 if thinking that his/ her country should follow its own interests, even if 
this leads to conflicts with other nations 
ISSP 
natsup  1 if agreeing with “generally speaking, your country is a better country 
than most other countries” 
ISSP 
dempr  1 if feeling proud of the way democracy works  ISSP 
econpr  1 if feeling proud of country economic achievement  ISSP 
lrinc  Logarithm of earnings  ISSP 
upper_class  1 if self-placement in 10 point income scale is between 6 and 10  ISSP 
eduyrs Years  of  schooling  ISSP 
union_  1 if currently member of an union  ISSP 
right  1 if party affiliation is right  ISSP 
ntmard  1 if not married  ISSP 
rlgn  1 if respondent attends religious services once a week or more   ISSP 
lgnipc  Logarithm of Gross National Income per capita, Atlas method (current 
US$) 
WORLD BANK 
lggdpmean  Logarithm of Gross Domestic Product growth 2000-2004  WORLD BANK 
agriculture  Logarithm of Value Added generated by agriculture sector  WORLD BANK 
industry  Logarithm of Value Added generated by industry sector  WORLD BANK 
service  Logarithm of Value Added generated by service sector  WORLD BANK 
lpxmean  Logarithm of exports of goods and services (percentage GDP, average 
2000-2004) 
WORLD BANK 
lpmmean  Logarithm of imports exports of goods and services (percentage GDP, 
average 2000-2004) 
WORLD BANK 
lpricemean  Logarithm of inflation (average 2000 – 2004)   
langoff_english  1 if Official language is English  CEPII 
langoff_spanish  1 if Official language is Spanish  CEPII 
loc_ue  1 if living nearer from EU than from USA or Asia  CEPII 
loc_us  1 if living nearer from USA than from EU or Asia  CEPII 
longcolony  1 if his/her country has been a colony for a long period  ISSP 
lowedu_richcountry  1 if years of schooling are lower than country average and country GDP 
per capita is higher than world average  
ISSP/ WORLD 
BANK 
lowedu_poorcountry  1 if years of schooling are lower than country average and country GDP 
per capita is lower than world average 
ISSP/ WORLD 
BANK 
highedu_poorcountry  1 if years of schooling are higher than country average and country 
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FIGURE 1: SHARE OF PEOPLE SUPPORTING PROTECTIONISM AND  




















































































0 10000 20000 30000 40000















































































.05 .1 .15 .2 .25
Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (includes tariffs and AVEs of NTBs)
 
   24
Japan





















































































0 20 40 60 80
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP), mean 2000-004, WDI
 
 
   
   25
TABLE 3: PROTECTIONISM OPINION – OPROBIT MODELS WITH FIX EFFECTS AND 
COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS 
  
Model 1 -          
with dummies 
per country 
Model 2 -          
with country 
characteristics 
Model 3 -          





Model 4 -          




gender  0.166*** 0.212*** 0.195*** 0.203*** 
   [0.023]  [0.023]  [0.023]  [0.024] 
age_ -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 
   [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
ntmard -0.024 -0.007 -0.005 -0.032 
   [0.030]  [0.034]  [0.030]  [0.031] 
eduyrs  -0.046*** -0.039*** -0.043*** -0.041*** 
   [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.005] 
upper_class -0.029  -0.063*** -0.060***  -0.050** 
   [0.023]  [0.024]  [0.023]  [0.022] 
lrinc -0.119***  -0.032*  -0.061***  -0.059*** 
   [0.026]  [0.018]  [0.015]  [0.015] 
rlgn  0.156*** 0.193*** 0.146*** 0.139*** 
   [0.031]  [0.047]  [0.037]  [0.039] 
right -0.083**  -0.045 -0.060 -0.049 
   [0.040]  [0.046]  [0.040]  [0.041] 
union_ 0.044 -0.044 -0.001 -0.005 
   [0.036]  [0.035]  [0.035]  [0.035] 
attach 0.001 -0.015 0.019 0.016 
   [0.038]  [0.041]  [0.039]  [0.044] 
pride  0.324*** 0.318*** 0.304*** 0.297*** 
   [0.029]  [0.030]  [0.030]  [0.030] 
natsup  0.175*** 0.205*** 0.174*** 0.187*** 
   [0.025]  [0.031]  [0.026]  [0.028] 
pride2  0.335*** 0.302*** 0.307*** 0.303*** 
   [0.032]  [0.030]  [0.034]  [0.036] 
dempr -0.073**  -0.080***  -0.086***  -0.073** 
   [0.030]  [0.030]  [0.031]  [0.032] 
econpr -0.042*  0.004  -0.039 -0.050* 
   [0.026]  [0.032]  [0.028]  [0.027] 
lgnipc     -0.162***  -0.007  0.010 
      [0.027]  [0.065]  [0.062] 
lpxmean      -0.853*** -1.037*** -1.014*** 
      [0.233]  [0.301]  [0.285] 
lpmmean      0.823*** 1.162*** 1.122*** 
      [0.222]  [0.390]  [0.371] 
lggdpmean        3.1  2.865 
         [1.966]  [1.850] 
lpricemean        3.394**  3.657**   26
         [1.629]  [1.582] 
langoff_english        0.147  0.146 
         [0.118]  [0.110] 
langoff_spanish        0.143*  0.206*** 
         [0.079]  [0.076] 
longcolony        -0.006  0.018 
         [0.124]  [0.110] 
loc_us        -0.145  -0.180* 
         [0.093]  [0.096] 
loc_ue        -0.249  -0.221 
         [0.170]  [0.158] 
industry           0.134*** 
            [0.034] 
service           0.069* 
            [0.036] 
agriculture           0.305*** 
            [0.105] 
Observations  21179 21179 21179 17560 
Pseudo R-squared  0.09  0.07  0.08  0.08 
 
 
TABLE 4: PROTECTIONISM OPINION - COUNTRIES CHARACTERISTICS   
 









gender 0.203***  0.194***  0.177***  0.152***  0.187***  0.238***  0.098* 
    [0.024] [0.034] [0.032] [0.034]  [0.033]  [0.026] [0.056] 
age_ -0.000  -0.004*  0.001  -0.006***  0.002  -0.002  0.001 
    [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]  [0.001]  [0.001] [0.002] 
ntmard  -0.032 -0.061 -0.034  -0.123*** 0.019  -0.061 0.040 
    [0.031] [0.074] [0.033] [0.042]  [0.041]  [0.039] [0.055] 
eduyrs -0.041***  -0.045***  -0.041***  -0.049***  -0.039***  -0.053***  -0.022** 
    [0.005] [0.008] [0.005] [0.006]  [0.007]  [0.004] [0.010] 
upper_class -0.050**  0.031  -0.056*  0.021  -0.028  -0.058** -0.040 
    [0.022] [0.027] [0.031] [0.025]  [0.034]  [0.026] [0.030] 
lrinc -0.059***  -0.116**  -0.077***  -0.269*** -0.050*** -0.060***  -0.035 
    [0.015] [0.048] [0.013] [0.046]  [0.014]  [0.022] [0.047] 
rlgn 0.139***  0.153***  0.132**  0.139**  0.158***  0.172***  0.148* 
    [0.039] [0.032] [0.052] [0.060]  [0.040]  [0.034] [0.088] 
right  -0.049 -0.053 -0.067 0.012  -0.107* -0.020  -0.235** 
    [0.041] [0.053] [0.057] [0.038]  [0.060]  [0.040] [0.113] 
union_ -0.005  -0.028  0.056  0.064*  0.037  0.030  -0.053 
    [0.035] [0.065] [0.036] [0.037]  [0.049]  [0.036] [0.106] 
attach  0.016 -0.018 0.017 -0.030  0.029  0.014 -0.027 
    [0.044] [0.061] [0.063] [0.069]  [0.054]  [0.057] [0.069] 
pride  0.297*** 0.389*** 0.261*** 0.342***  0.302***  0.304*** 0.295*** 
    [0.030] [0.058] [0.033] [0.047]  [0.039]  [0.033] [0.050]   27
natsup 0.187***  0.111*  0.227***  0.246*** 0.181*** 0.219*** 0.111** 
    [0.028] [0.057] [0.029] [0.050]  [0.032]  [0.031] [0.053] 
pride2  0.303*** 0.322*** 0.324*** 0.364***  0.287***  0.305*** 0.335*** 
    [0.036] [0.050] [0.049] [0.070]  [0.043]  [0.039] [0.075] 
dempr -0.073**  0.007  -0.100***  -0.107**  -0.033  -0.086**  -0.053 
    [0.032] [0.075] [0.027] [0.046]  [0.039]  [0.036] [0.063] 
econpr -0.050*  -0.031  -0.062**  -0.087*  -0.026  -0.048  -0.053 
    [0.027] [0.058] [0.030] [0.053]  [0.030]  [0.029] [0.051] 
industry 0.134***  0.176***  0.095**  0.114**  0.122***  0.171***  0.036 
    [0.034] [0.058] [0.044] [0.052]  [0.046]  [0.035] [0.067] 
service 0.069*  0.157***  0.021  0.133**  0.041  0.108***  -0.004 
    [0.036] [0.039] [0.045] [0.057]  [0.043]  [0.038] [0.065] 
agriculture 0.305***  0.313* 0.291**  0.461*** 0.226* 0.509*** 0.066 
    [0.105] [0.166] [0.127] [0.160]  [0.120]  [0.115] [0.135] 
lgnipc 0.010  -0.273***  0.081  1.323***  -0.000  0.125  -0.036 
    [0.062] [0.103] [0.100] [0.189]  [0.058]  [0.186] [0.117] 
lpxmean -1.014***  0.333  -0.832**  0.575 -1.255***  -0.911***  -1.882** 
    [0.285] [0.279] [0.410] [1.142]  [0.172]  [0.296] [0.775] 
lpmmean 1.122***  -0.848**  1.286***  -0.744  1.358***  0.932**  2.096*** 
    [0.371] [0.381] [0.405] [1.172]  [0.219]  [0.446] [0.715] 
langoff_english 0.146  0.563***  0.017 0.322*  0.018 0.289***  0.139 
    [0.110] [0.179] [0.132] [0.184]  [0.152]  [0.104] [0.164] 
langoff_spanish 0.206***  0.185***  -0.213  -0.519**  0.138  0.164    
    [0.076] [0.050] [0.190] [0.210]  [0.199]  [0.148]    
longcolony 0.018 -0.146 0.022  -0.824***  -0.005 -0.092 0.034 
    [0.110] [0.215] [0.080] [0.182]  [0.095]  [0.137] [0.186] 
loc_us -0.180*  0.555**       -0.232*  -0.297**  0.174 
   [0.096]  [0.278]        [0.119]  [0.119]  [0.128] 
loc_ue -0.221  0.861***  -0.682***     -0.239  -0.283    
    [0.158] [0.171] [0.249]     [0.154]  [0.180]    
lggdpmean 2,865  33.136***  3,580  1042  0.504  3,823 0.419 
    [1.850] [8.538] [2.398] [8.204]  [1.477]  [3.365] [1.795] 
lpricemean 3.657**  -13.470***  7.242***  49.294***  4.085***  5.528**  6.384** 
    [1.582] [3.801] [1.513]  [15.700] [1.095]  [2.594] [3.192] 
Observations 17560 5452 12108 5742  11818 12282 5278 
Pseudo R-
squared  0.08 0.06 0.09 0.10  0.07  0.08 0.05 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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TABLE 5: PROTECTIONISM OPINION - INDIVIDUAL STATUS AND COUNTRY 
ENDOWMENT 
  protect protect 
gender 0.204***  0.202*** 
   [0.025]  [0.024] 
age_ 0.000  0.001 
   [0.001]  [0.001] 
ntmard -0.013  -0.010 
   [0.032]  [0.034] 
rlgn 0.146***  0.153*** 
   [0.038]  [0.036] 
right -0.036  -0.037 
   [0.041]  [0.038] 
union_ -0.041  -0.024 
   [0.040]  [0.035] 
attach 0.003  0.012 
   [0.036]  [0.041] 
pride 0.274***  0.311*** 
   [0.027]  [0.026] 
natsup 0.183***  0.188*** 
   [0.029]  [0.025] 
pride2 0.322***  0.306*** 
   [0.036]  [0.033] 
dempr -0.053*  -0.087*** 
   [0.032]  [0.032] 
econpr -0.057**  -0.035 
   [0.026]  [0.024] 
industry 0.118***  0.166*** 
   [0.030]  [0.034] 
service 0.071**  0.080** 
   [0.033]  [0.033] 
agriculture 0.301***  0.328*** 
   [0.096]  [0.094] 
lpxmean -0.568***  -0.580*** 
   [0.185]  [0.136] 
lpmmean 0.455**  0.584*** 
   [0.221]  [0.181] 
langoff_english 0.234***  0.255** 
   [0.077]  [0.100] 
langoff_spanish 0.128 0.255*** 
   [0.087]  [0.080] 
longcolony 0.046  0.004 
   [0.112]  [0.125] 
loc_us -0.147*  -0.114 
   [0.087]  [0.111] 
loc_ue 0.044  -0.061   29
   [0.094]  [0.114] 
upper_class -0.060**  -0.086*** 
   [0.025]  [0.023] 
lgnipc 0.046  -0.206*** 
   [0.090]  [0.063] 
eduyrs 0.129*   
   [0.069]    
eduipc -0.018**   
   [0.007]    
lowedu_richcount     0.277*** 
      [0.023] 
lowedu_poorcount     0.112 
      [0.127] 
highedu_poorcount     -0.038 
      [0.144] 
lrinc     -0.045*** 
      [0.016] 
Observations 22359 18899 
Pseudo R-squared  0.07  0.07 
   Robust standard errors in brackets 
   * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
TABLE 6: FIX EFFECTS AND COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS - MARGINAL EFFECTS 
 
Model 1 - with 
dummies per 
country 
Model 2 - with 
country 
characteristics
Model 3 - 






Model 4 - 










probability  0.5539 0.5543 0.5539 0.5575 0.5580 
   dy/dx X dy/dx X dy/dx X dy/dx X dy/dx X 
gender  0.066 0.474 0.083 0.474 0.077 0.474 0.080 0.467 0.081 0.480 
age_  0.000 45.877 0.000 45.877 0.000 45.877 0.000 44.915         
ntmard  -0.010 0.224 -0.003 0.224 -0.002 0.224 -0.013 0.227         
eduyrs  -0.018 12.143 -0.016 12.143 -0.017 12.143 -0.016 12.214 -0.016 12.209
upper_class  -0.011 0.480 -0.025 0.480 -0.024 0.480 -0.020 0.478 -0.029 0.478 
lrinc  -0.047 4.101 -0.013 4.101 -0.024 4.101 -0.023 4.092 -0.025 4.099 
rlgn  0.061 0.145 0.075 0.145 0.057 0.145 0.054 0.144 0.049 0.140 
right  -0.033 0.238 -0.018 0.238 -0.024 0.238 -0.019 0.239 0.113 0.752 
union_  0.017 0.243 -0.017 0.243 -0.001 0.243 -0.002 0.264         
attach  0.000 0.897 -0.006 0.897 0.007 0.897 0.006 0.895         
pride  0.129 0.756 0.126 0.756 0.121 0.756 0.118 0.755         
natsup  0.069 0.532 0.081 0.532 0.069 0.532 0.074 0.526 0.066 0.524 
pride2  0.132 0.521 0.119 0.521 0.121 0.521 0.119 0.517 0.125 0.515 
dempr  -0.029 0.567 -0.031 0.567 -0.034 0.567 -0.029 0.563         
econpr  -0.017 0.547 0.002 0.547 -0.015 0.547 -0.020 0.539         
lgnipc          -0.064 9519 -0.003 9519 0.004  9523  -0.006 9530  30
lpxmean          -0.337 3605 -0.410 3605 -0.400 3604  -0.392 3603
lpmmean          0.325 3565 0.459 3565 0.443 3569  0.426 3564
lggdpmean              1225 4635 1131 4635  0.985  4635
lpricemean              1342 4644 1444 4644  1456  4645
langoff_english              0.058  0.281  0.057  0.285  0.053  0.285 
langoff_spanish              0.056  0.110  0.080  0.101  0.056  0.096 
longcolony              -0.002  0.571  0.007  0.565  0.017  0.557 
loc_us              -0.058  0.151  -0.071  0.140  -0.065  0.136 
loc_ue              -0.098  0.658  -0.087  0.673  -0.073  0.676 
industry                    0.053  0.192  0.047  0.191 
service                    0.027  0.641  0.021  0.641 
agriculture                    0.117  0.060  0.108  0.060 
 
 
TABLE 7: COUNTRIES CHARACTERISTICS - MARGINAL EFFECTS 










General probability  0.5575 0.5613 0.5560 0.4817 0.5930 0.5039 0.6759 
    dy/dx X dy/dx X dy/dx X dy/dx X dy/dx X dy/dx X dy/dx X 
gender  0.08 0.47 0.08 0.44 0.07 0.48 0.06 0.47 0.07 0.47 0.09 0.47 0.04 0.46 
age_  0.00 44.91 0.00 42.19 0.00 46.19 0.00 45.38 0.00 44.69 0.00 45.38 0.00 43.84
ntmard  -0.01 0.23 -0.02 0.21 -0.01 0.23 -0.05 0.27 0.01 0.21 -0.02 0.24 0.01 0.20 
eduyrs  -0.02 12.21 -0.02 12.31 -0.02 12.17 -0.02 11.74 -0.01 12.45 -0.02 12.54 -0.01 11.45
upper_class  -0.02 0.48 0.01 0.44 -0.02 0.49 0.01 0.51 -0.01 0.46 -0.02 0.56 -0.01 0.29 
lrinc  -0.02 4.09 -0.05 3.58 -0.03 4.33 -0.11 3.81 -0.02 4.23 -0.02 4.15 -0.01 3.96 
rlgn  0.05 0.14 0.06 0.17 0.05 0.13 0.06 0.13 0.06 0.15 0.07 0.13 0.05 0.17 
right  -0.02 0.24 -0.02 0.24 -0.03 0.24 0.00 0.27 -0.04 0.22 -0.01 0.27 -0.09 0.16 
union_  0.00 0.26 -0.01 0.17 0.02 0.31 0.03 0.38 0.01 0.21 0.01 0.31 -0.02 0.15 
attach  0.01 0.89 -0.01 0.84 0.01 0.92 -0.01 0.90 0.01 0.89 0.01 0.90 -0.01 0.88 
pride  0.12 0.76 0.15 0.74 0.10 0.76 0.13 0.73 0.12 0.77 0.12 0.75 0.11 0.76 
natsup  0.07 0.53 0.04 0.52 0.09 0.53 0.10 0.52 0.07 0.53 0.09 0.58 0.04 0.40 
pride2  0.12 0.52 0.13 0.48 0.13 0.53 0.14 0.54 0.11 0.51 0.12 0.50 0.12 0.57 
dempr  -0.03 0.56 0.00 0.55 -0.04 0.57 -0.04 0.64 -0.01 0.53 -0.03 0.66 -0.02 0.34 
econpr  -0.02 0.54 -0.01 0.54 -0.02 0.54 -0.03 0.58 -0.01 0.52 -0.02 0.64 -0.02 0.31 
industry  0.05 0.19 0.07 0.18 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.19 0.05 0.19 0.07 0.18 0.01 0.22 
service  0.03 0.64 0.06 0.64 0.01 0.64 0.05 0.66 0.02 0.63 0.04 0.67 0.00 0.57 
agriculture  0.12 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.18 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.20 0.05 0.02 0.09 
lgnipc  0.00 9.52 -0.11 9.47 0.03 9.55 0.53  10.08 0.00 9.25 0.05  10.08  -0.01 8.22 
lpxmean  -0.40 3.60 0.13 3.32 -0.33 3.74 0.23 3.69 -0.49 3.56 -0.36 3.53 -0.68 3.78 
lpmmean  0.44 3.57 -0.33 3.29 0.51 3.70 -0.30 3.64 0.53 3.53 0.37 3.48 0.75 3.77 
langoff_english  0.06 0.28 0.22 0.35 0.01 0.25 0.13 0.16 0.01 0.35 0.11 0.37 0.05 0.09 
langoff_spanish  0.08 0.10 0.07 0.08 -0.08 0.11 -0.20 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.04         
longcolony  0.01 0.56 -0.06 0.46 0.01 0.61 -0.31 0.19 0.00 0.75 -0.04 0.47 0.01 0.78 
loc_us  -0.07  0.14  0.21  0.21              -0.09 0.21  -0.12  0.09  0.06  0.25 
loc_ue  -0.09 0.67 0.33 0.54 -0.26 0.73          -0.09 0.51 -0.11 0.68         
lggdpmean  1.13 4.64  13.06  4.64 1.41 4.63 0.42 4.63 0.20 4.64 1.53 4.63 0.15 4.64 
lpricemean  1.44 4.64 -5.31 4.65 2.86 4.64  19.64 4.63 1.59 4.65 2.21 4.63 2.29 4.68   31
TABLE 8: INDIVIDUAL STATUS AND COUNTRY ENDOWMENT - MARGINAL EFFECTS 
  Probability = .57123122  Probability = .55900823 
  dy/dx X  dy/dx X 
gender*  0.080 0.485  0.080 0.467 
age_  0.000 45.602  0.000 44.675 
ntmard*  -0.005 0.214  -0.004 0.243 
rlgn*  0.057 0.157  0.060 0.147 
right*  -0.014 0.233  -0.015 0.237 
union_*  -0.016 0.231  -0.009 0.262 
attach*  0.001 0.891  0.005 0.895 
pride*  0.108 0.761  0.123 0.756 
natsup*  0.072 0.521  0.074 0.530 
pride2*  0.126 0.524  0.120 0.520 
dempr*  -0.021 0.541  -0.034 0.563 
econpr*  -0.022 0.524  -0.014 0.539 
industry*  0.046 0.195  0.065 0.190 
service*  0.028 0.636  0.032 0.644 
agriculture*  0.114 0.059  0.125 0.061 
lpxmean  -0.223 3.594  -0.229 3.602 
lpmmean  0.179 3.565  0.231 3.557 
langoff_english*  0.091 0.290  0.100 0.277 
langoff_spanish*  0.050 0.098  0.099 0.119 
longcolony*  0.018 0.568  0.001 0.575 
loc_us*  -0.058 0.133  -0.045 0.156 
loc_ue* 0.017  0.684  -0.024  0.663 
upper_class*  -0.024 0.460  -0.034 0.479 
lgnipc 0.018  9.450  -0.081  9.498 
eduyrs 0.051  12.035         
eduipc -0.007  114,459        
lowedu_richcount         0.107  0.238 
lowedu_poorcount         0.044  0.300 
highedu_poorcount         -0.015  0.203 
lrinc         -0.018  41.584 
 
 